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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Economic literature distinguishes between active and passive investors. In contrast to 
passive investors, who hold a fraction of a company’s equity without getting involved in 
the business or strategy of the portfolio company, active investors participate in managing 
their investment. This participation may include actions like monitoring management, 
sitting on the board of directors, dismissing management and usually influencing corporate 
strategy. 
 
Following regulation of financial institutions in the U.S. in the first half of the 20th 
century,  a new group of financial institutions evolved. As a special form of active 
investors, the group of private equity investors, took over the previous role of banks in 
monitoring and actively managing their portfolio companies. With this approach they aim 
to increase the value of their investment which eventually has to go hand in hand with an 
improvement in operational performance of the underlying companies. As of now only one 
part of the obvious research question whether and through which mechanisms this 
modified  organizational structure creates value has been addressed. Empirical papers 
which focus on the question whether these investors create value by actively managing 
their  investments and thereby increasing operating performance mainly find 
outperformance of private equity portfolio companies during their private time. 
 
However, what still has to be analyzed is the origin of the value creation. If private equity 
investors are not just investing in the right company at the right point in time there may 
exist systematic value drivers which might be eventually observable. Consequently, there 
has to be some forces which distinguish the top performing companies from the  least 
performing ones. Problematic in analyzing this issue is the fact that these investors refuse 
to disclose information regarding financial and operational performance as well as 
restructuring activities undertaken. Though with our data collection approach we have 
identified a way to obtain comprehensive information on both operational performance 
data and restructuring actions for the private time of the portfolio companies. Our main 
research question therefore focuses on which of the common tools
1  private equity 
investors  use to restructure their portfolio companies are responsible for the 
aforementioned outperformance and performance variation. In this manner we try to shed 
light into the black box of organizational and operational restructuring activities and their 
impact on operating efficiency. 
 
1  Although in general the tools PE investors commonly use for their active investing 
approach are well known there has been hardly any systematic research regarding their 
particular influence on operational performance. 
                                                           The particular approach private equity investors employ to generate value is to take on a 
majority position in the equity of the company
2  and at the same time get a sizeable 
interest on the board of directors. Hence, they are able to exert control over 
management,  thereby influence decision making and at the end corporate strategy. 
Superior organizational  structure and the high equity stake as well as a large pay for 
performance sensitivity  lead to clear cut incentives for the private equity investor to 
maximize shareholder value.  Effort to increase equity value does often include 
restructuring of the company, which can  mean both, organizational and operational 
restructuring activities. In our analysis we  took advantage of the fact that buyout 
transactions that are eventually taken public after  the restructuring period have to 
disclose information for public investors. As operational performance has to be stated at 
least 3 years back we were able to track performance during the private period. We then 
screened the corresponding IPO prospectuses for information about previous changes in the 
governance structure or operational strategy  that took place during the period the 
companies belonged to a private equity investor’s portfolio. 
 
We find large increases in operational performance of our private equity portfolio 
companies but at the same time huge variance among growth rates. We are able to 
identify a set of actions influencing operational performance during the restructuring 
period: Steep incentives, frequent asset restructuring, tight monitoring and experienced 
investors are all characteristics that lead to superior growth rates in operating efficiency. 
In addition US companies have significantly higher financial leverage ratios than European 
portfolio companies and they outperform their European counterparts while being private. 
2 Using both equity and debt to finance their equity stake thus increasing financial leverage 
of the portfolio company. 
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Abstract
We are able to shed light on the black box of restructuring tools private equity
investors use to improve the operational performance of their portfolio companies.
By building on previous work considering performance evaluation of PE backed
companies, we analyze whether private equity improves operating efﬁciency and
which of the typical restructuring tools are the main performance drivers. Using a
set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions of the last thirty years,
we ﬁnd that while there is vast improvement in operational efﬁciency, these gains
vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity
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1JEL classiﬁcation: G23, G24, G32, G341 Introduction
Economic literature distinguishes between active and passive investors. In contrast to
passive investors, who hold a fraction of a company’s equity without getting involved
in the business or strategy of the portfolio company, active investors participate in
managing their investment. According to Jensen (1989a) this participation can include
actionslikemonitoringmanagement, sittingontheboardofdirectors, dismissingman-
agement and usually inﬂuencing corporate strategy.
Following regulation of ﬁnancial institutions in the US in the ﬁrst half of the 20th
century, a new group of ﬁnancial institutions evolved. As a special form of active in-
vestors, the group of private equity investors took over the previous role of banks in
monitoring and actively managing their portfolio companies. With this approach they
aimed to increase the value of their investment which eventually has to go hand in
hand with an improvement in operational performance of the underlying company. So
far, only one part of the research question, whether and through what mechanisms this
modiﬁed organizational structure creates value, has been addressed. Empirical papers
with a focus on whether PE investors create value by actively managing their invest-
ments and thereby increasing operating performance, mainly ﬁnd outperformance of
portfolio companies during the private period.1
However, determinants of value creation still have to be analyzed. If private equity
investors are not simply investing in the right company at the right point in time, sys-
tematic value drivers should exist. As a matter of fact while Guo et al. (2011) ﬁnd only
small operating performance gains, they also document substantial performance vari-
ation within their sample. Consequently, there have to be some characteristics which
distinguish the top performing companies from the poorest performing ones. What
is problematic in analyzing this issue is the fact that PE investors generally refuse to
disclose information regarding ﬁnancial and operational performance as well as strat-
egy and restructuring activities during the private period. However, with our data
collection approach we have identiﬁed a way of obtaining comprehensive information
on both operational performance and restructuring activities for the private time of
the portfolio companies. Our main research question therefore considers, which of the
common tools that private equity investors use to restructure their portfolio companies
are responsible for performance variation among a sample of PE backed companies.
We decipher the black box of organizational and operational restructuring activities
and ﬁgure out impacts on operating efﬁciency. Although PE investors’ restructuring
tools are well known, there has hardly been any systematic research regarding their
particular inﬂuence on operational performance.
1Kaplan (1989), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) and Gill and Visnjic (2010) in general ﬁnd positive
effects on operational performance after buyouts.
1PE investors typically hold majority stakes in their portfolio companies2 and are
usually well represented on the board of directors. As a consequence, they are able
to exert control over management and inﬂuence decision-making and ﬁnally corpo-
rate strategy. High equity stakes and large pay for performance sensitivities lead to
clear-cut incentives for the PE investor to maximize shareholder value. Efforts to in-
crease equity value often includes restructuring of the company, which can mean both
organizational and operational restructuring activities. We took advantage of the fact
that buyout backed companies which are eventually taken public after the restructur-
ing period have to disclose information for future public investors. As ﬁnancials have
to be stated for at least the previous three years, we were able to track performance
during the private period. Subsequently we screened the corresponding IPO prospec-
tus for information about previous changes in the governance structure or operational
strategy.
After evaluating the data we categorize our variables into six groups with a po-
tential impact on operational performance: ﬁnancial leverage; operating restructuring
activities; ownership and control characteristics; management and investor ability and
experience; managerial replacement; incentives structure. On the back of theoretically
motivated hypotheses we analyze the inﬂuence of the variables on operational perfor-
mance. We start with a single explanatory variable per regression. Afterwards we test
the results for each hypothesis by adding all the explanatory variables into one regres-
sion. Finally, we check for robustness by running regressions for all variables which
show signiﬁcance.
We ﬁnd on average an increasing operational performance with large a variance
within our sample companies. The following set of activities signiﬁcantly drive opera-
tional performance during the restructuring period: Steep incentives, frequent asset re-
structuring, tight monitoring and investors experience. These variables have a positive
effect on operating efﬁciency. Furthermore, US companies have signiﬁcantly higher ﬁ-
nancial leverage ratios than European portfolio companies and they outperform their
European counterparts during the private period.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe our sample selection as
well as data collection process followed by summary statistics on sample distribution
and portfolio company characteristics. Section 3 outlines our theoretically backed hy-
pothesis. Hypothesis tests and robustness checks are shown in section 4 and 5. Finally
section 6 concludes.
2Usingdebttoﬁnancetheirequitystakethusincreasingﬁnancialleverageatportfoliocompanylevel.
22 SampleSelection, DataDescriptionandSummaryStatis-
tics
In order to analyze what determines performance variation among private equity port-
folio companies, at the same time we require data on operational performance and
transaction and restructuring characteristics. To match our data requirements, we
checked a population of roughly 900 LBO transactions between 1980 and 2006 in the
Thomson One ”Venture Economics” database.
2.1 Selection Criteria
For better information availability we make sure that the companies are public at the
time of data collection in order to be included in our sample. This criterion brings
down the number of companies from 900 to 303. This step is crucial for our purposes
as our analysis depends on good data availability for both transaction and company
characteristics. Furthermore we double-checked every transaction in Lexis Nexis for
transaction details such as the seller’s and the buyer’s identity. Wherever possible we
include deal metrics such as company valuation and ﬁnancial structure of the deal.
Concerning the buyout transaction type (i.e., the organizational form of the company
at the time of the buyout) we ﬁnd that of our 303 companies 64 meet the criteria of
a divisional spin-off. 54 observations are public stand-alone companies at the time
of the data collection as well as before their LBO, which is the deﬁnition of a reverse
leveraged buyout transaction. These two groups differ strongly with respect to their
organizational form. As a consequence, they also differ in terms of the underlying cor-
porate governance structure at the time of the LBO. As this disparity could inﬂuence
operational performance within our sample, we decided to divide the sample into sub-
groups. Basically there arethree typesof transactions, which differwith respectto their
organization at the time of the LBO: divisional spin-offs (spin-offs), public stand-alone
companies (RLBO) and the remaining are private stand-alone companies. We present
summary statistics for all three groups and create dummy variables for the regressions.
2.2 Descriptive Data
The companies in our sample are mainly incorporated in the United States (214). The
remainder are from Western Europe (85), Australia (3) and New Zealand (1). As a
matter of fact, we only include companies in our sample where an English copy of the
IPO prospectus is available. This obviously has a strong inﬂuence on the origin of our
companies. However, as it is in particular unclear whether US evidence on sources
of wealth gains does hold for UK and continental European transactions, a distinc-
3tion between US and Western European transactions is important. As a consequence,
we distinguished between US and non US companies to ﬁgure out operational dis-
similarities in the summary statistics section and included a US control dummy in the
regressions.
Regarding industries, we have Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes avail-
able for all companies. The distribution is as follows: 134 companies operate in the
manufacturing business, 55 in services, 34 in retail trade, 28 in transportation and
communication, 25 in ﬁnance and insurance, 13 in wholesale trade, 9 in mining, 3
in construction and 1 each in agriculture and public administration.
Total US Spinoff RLBO
obs. % obs. % obs. % obs. %
1981 1 0.3 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0
1982 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1983 1 0.3 1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.9
1984 3 1.0 3 1.4 0 0.0 2 3.7
1985 4 1.3 4 1.9 0 0.0 2 3.7
1986 5 1.7 5 2.4 1 1.6 1 1.9
1987 8 2.6 8 3.8 1 1.6 5 9.3
1988 10 3.3 10 4.8 2 3.1 5 9.3
1989 12 4.0 12 5.7 2 3.1 4 7.4
1990 5 1.7 5 2.4 2 3.1 0 0.0
1991 2 0.7 1 0.5 1 1.6 0 0.0
1992 6 2.0 5 2.4 1 1.6 0 0.0
1993 4 1.3 2 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1994 5 1.7 3 1.4 1 1.6 0 0.0
1995 2 0.7 1 0.5 1 1.6 0 0.0
1996 13 4.3 9 4.3 2 3.1 2 3.7
1997 19 6.3 15 7.2 2 3.1 3 5.6
1998 21 6.9 15 7.2 4 6.3 5 9.3
1999 38 12.5 19 9.1 12 18.8 4 7.4
2000 19 6.3 12 5.7 4 6.3 4 7.4
2001 17 5.6 8 3.8 3 4.7 2 3.7
2002 28 9.2 16 7.7 10 15.6 4 7.4
2003 29 9.6 21 10.0 5 7.8 6 11.1
2004 27 8.9 14 6.7 7 10.9 2 3.7
2005 19 6.3 15 7.2 2 3.1 2 3.7
2006 5 1.7 4 1.9 1 1.6 0 0.0
2007 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2008 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 303 100.0 209 100.0 64 100.0 55 100.0
Table 1: Sample overview on LBO calendar year distribution for all ﬁrms that were public at the time of data collection (All), are
located in the US (US), are subject to a Spin-Off from a parent company (Spinoff) and have undergone a reverse LBO transaction
(RLBO).
Table 1 gives an overview on distribution of LBO transactions in our sample. There
are clearly two waves of buyouts identiﬁed for the total sample. The ﬁrst buyout wave
starts in the late ’80s and has its peak in 1989 where 4% of our sample companies had
their buyout. The second and by far larger buyout wave takes place during the late
’90s and early 2000s. The peak of this wave occurs in 1999, where over 12% of our
sample companies have their buyout.
4Total US Spinoff RLBO
obs. % obs. % obs. % obs. %
1981 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1982 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1983 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1984 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1985 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1986 1 0.3 1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.8
1987 3 1.0 3 1.4 0 0.0 1 1.8
1988 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1989 2 0.7 2 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1990 3 1.0 3 1.4 0 0.0 2 3.6
1991 13 4.3 13 6.2 2 3.1 7 12.7
1992 11 3.6 8 3.8 1 1.6 3 5.5
1993 8 2.6 7 3.3 2 3.1 3 5.5
1994 4 1.3 4 1.9 0 0.0 3 5.5
1995 4 1.3 2 1.0 3 4.7 0 0.0
1996 6 2.0 4 1.9 1 1.6 0 0.0
1997 9 3.0 5 2.4 2 3.1 0 0.0
1998 3 1.0 1 0.5 1 1.6 0 0.0
1999 12 4.0 9 4.3 3 4.7 1 1.8
2000 12 4.0 9 4.3 5 7.8 0 0.0
2001 14 4.6 9 4.3 2 3.1 3 5.5
2002 13 4.3 8 3.8 2 3.1 3 5.5
2003 10 3.3 9 4.3 1 1.6 3 5.5
2004 49 16.2 33 15.8 11 17.2 10 18.2
2005 40 13.2 27 12.9 9 14.1 4 7.3
2006 56 18.5 36 17.2 12 18.8 8 14.5
2007 28 9.2 14 6.7 6 9.4 3 5.5
2008 2 0.7 2 1.0 1 1.6 0 0.0
Total 303 100.0 209 100.0 64 100.0 55 100.0
Table 2: Sample overview on IPO calendar year distribution for all ﬁrms that were public at the time of data collection (All), are
located in the US (US), are subject to a Spin-Off from a parent company (Spinoff) and have undergone a reverse LBO transaction
(RLBO).
IPOs also appear in two waves, as shown in table 2. The ﬁrst wave starts in the
early ’90s, four years after the ﬁrst buyout wave started. The second wave starts three
years after the second buyout wave. There seems to be better data availability in the
Thomson One database for transactions beginning in the ’90s. This could be a source
for a possible sample selection bias. However, these effects should be rather low as
our sample matches the pattern of buyout waves other studies on leveraged buyouts
transactions found (see for example Renneboog and Simons (2005)).
The average duration of the private period for the full sample is 3.7 years with a
standard deviation of 2.2 and a range from 1 to 11 years. This ﬁgure is in line with
the typical three to ﬁve years private equity investors keep their portfolio companies
private before they begin the exit process (using an IPO in our case). Even if US com-
panies and RLBO transactions have a slightly higher average investment duration and
spinoff transactions a slightly lower, none of these differences are signiﬁcant.
2.3 Performance Data and Restructuring Characteristics
With respect to company speciﬁc information, we collected ﬁnancial and operational
data like income statement, balance sheet and cash ﬂow ﬁgures. This serves as in-
put for our operating efﬁciency ratios, which represent the dependent variables in our
5regressions.
Variable Description Source
Gross Proﬁt Gross Proﬁt divided by total sales Income Statement
EBITDA EBITDA divided by total sales Income Statement
Net Income Net Income divided by total sales Income Statement
CFOA Cash ﬂow from operating activities divided by
total sales
Income & Cash
Flow Statement
Table 3: Description and sources for all dependent variables. Source for data is Compustat with amendments from Bloomberg
and the IPO Prospectuses.
By using four different proﬁtability ratios we make sure that we cover all possible
sources of efﬁciency changes. Increases in efﬁciency can be achieved either by top
line growth (i.e., revenue growth) and at the same time stable costs or by cutting costs
while keeping sales constant. As shown by the details on the response variables in
table 3, all proﬁtability, respectively cash ﬂow ﬁgures are divided by sales. Thereby we
make sure to account for top line growth. Our three efﬁciency ratio inputs, which come
from the income statement, differ in the degree of costs that are included. Gross proﬁt,
which is the broadest proﬁt ﬁgure, is derived by subtracting direct production costs
from sales. EBITDA is derived by subtracting direct production and administrative
costs from sales. Net income, which stands at the bottom of the income statement,
is derived by subtracting direct production costs, administrative costs, ﬁnancial costs
and tax from sales. We add cash ﬂow from operating activity over sales as our fourth
response variable. Cash ﬂow ﬁgures are generally harder to manipulate. We use all
four efﬁciency ratios in analyzing the impact of restructuring activities on operational
performance.
Information on the corporate governance characteristics of the companies, like in-
formation on management, ownership data, compensation and incentive structure, as
well as data on operational strategy changes, like acquisitions and divestitures serve
as our set of explanatory variables. The resulting 13 explanatory variables are either
proxies for typical private equity restructuring activities or represent investor and ex-
ecutive management characteristics, like type and experience. For a detailed variable
descriptions including sources see table 4.
6Variable Hypothesis Description Source
Leverage 1: Financial leverage Book value of short and long term debt over
book value of total assets after the LBO transac-
tion
Bloomberg,
Compustat, IPO
Prospectus
Acquisitions 2: Asset restructuring Number of acquisitions executed during restruc-
turing period
IPO prospectus
Divestitures 2: Asset restructuring Number of divestitures executed during restruc-
turing period
IPO prospectus
Director Ratio 3: Monitoring / control Share of directors belonging to the private equity
investor
IPO prospectus
PE Chairman 3: Monitoring / control Dummy variable with value 1 if the Chairman
belongs to the PE investor, 0 otherwise
IPO prospectus
PE Stake 3: Monitoring / control Fraction of the company’s outstanding equity
the investor holds at the time of the LBO
IPO prospectus
Independent PE 4: Management / in-
vestor ability
Dummy variable indication whether the PE in-
vestor belongs to a Bank or other institution (=0)
or is independent (=1)
Thomson One
PE Age at LBO 4: Management / in-
vestor ability
Number of years the PE investor is in business PE Homepage
Amount Invested 4: Management / in-
vestor ability
Aggregated amount the PE investor invested Thomson One
Management Change 5: Managerial replace-
ment
Dummy variable showing equal to 1 if a member
of the executive management team is replaced
during the restructuring period
IPO prospectus
Bonus to Base 6: Incentives Ratio of value of cash bonus payments to value
of cash base compensation
IPO prospectus
Equity Incentives 6: Incentives Share of outstanding equity that is used for in-
centive compensation structures of key employ-
ees
IPO prospectus
Management Stake 6: Incentives Fraction of the company’s outstanding equity
the management holds at the time of the LBO
IPO prospectus
Table 4: Description and sources for all explanatory variables. The corresponding hypothesis is indicated in the second column.
Usingthisdatacollectionapproach, wemakesurethatweincludeallavailablepub-
lic data for ﬁguring out operational performance determinants of PE portfolio compa-
nies. At this point in time we neglect potential cross synergies with other companies
belonging to the same PE portfolio, however this could be an interesting topic for fu-
ture research.
2.4 Operational Summary Statistics
In order to determine the inﬂuence of PE investors’ active investing approach on op-
erational performance of the portfolio companies, we calculate mean values as well as
standard deviation for several basic income statement and balance sheet ﬁgures. We
do so for the time of the initiation of the investment (buyout) and subsequent ﬂoat-
ing of the company on a stock exchange (IPO, which is the starting point of the exit
process). Heterogeneity among industry, size, stage of the company and particular in-
vestment duration in our sample leads to sizeable variations in operational data and
growth rates. For interpretation purposes we add median levels in the summary statis-
tics section.
A couple of common operational and ﬁnancial ratios provide an overview on gen-
7eral changes in operating efﬁciency and capital structure. Observations range from
128 to 218, primarily due to constraints in data availability at the time of the buyout.
In particular, ﬁgures using the size of the workforce as an input have a much lower
number of observations.3
Buyout IPO Growth
obs. mean median stdv. mean median stdv. mean median stdv.
Sales 218 829.65 262.86 2034.14 1194.80 461.71 2251.46 118% 61% 174%
COGS 188 591.92 170.35 1507.88 846.61 279.91 1673.67 120% 53% 193%
SGA 182 167.45 51.78 416.67 235.75 77.85 442.88 139% 55% 290%
EBITDA 146 124.36 48.71 282.72 200.36 100.43 363.01 154% 83% 262%
EBIT 209 49.10 20.62 127.83 104.27 51.05 162.58 271% 103% 1017%
Interest Expense 192 42.88 11.03 167.35 57.39 21.38 162.15 239% 37% 757%
Tax 190 11.46 3.02 32.46 19.30 10.17 31.82 435% 130% 1548%
Net Income 214  3.13 1.60 93.21 32.95 16.86 87.41 302% 135% 1737%
Cash 163 56.52 12.76 146.52 66.26 28.37 123.11 271% 102% 503%
Current Assets 131 302.62 110.19 590.62 387.73 160.27 697.90 98% 47% 159%
Total Assets 207 1145.49 330.92 3189.90 1393.45 517.18 3082.92 118% 35% 209%
Current Liab. 132 243.95 70.85 512.43 308.85 116.28 553.25 79% 40% 130%
Total Liab. 197 1011.81 283.18 2676.45 1081.24 370.02 2451.53 65% 5% 185%
Shrd. Equity 205 168.48 37.63 762.97 351.72 143.81 819.55 562% 182% 1066%
Working Capital 145 64.87 30.78 170.79 93.62 54.45 253.58 243% 74% 535%
# Employees 77 7.22 1.89 21.22 7.02 1.87 15.59 40% 12% 97%
Liquidity Ratio 128 1.53 1.36 0.85 1.85 1.57 1.94 35% 5% 118%
Leverage 180 0.58 0.56 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.26 -13% -30% 119%
Sales/Employees 77 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.54 0.23 1.85 66% 25% 166%
EBIT/Employees 77 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.71 113% 40% 252%
ROA 205  0.04 0.01 0.44 0.05 0.04 0.07 132% 98% 420%
Asset Turnover 207 1.18 0.88 0.97 1.20 0.98 0.92 30% 13% 126%
ROE 153 0.10 0.05 1.40 0.12 0.11 0.37 72% 47% 252%
Gross Margin 187 0.36 0.31 0.22 0.38 0.34 0.21 16% 5% 57%
Operating Margin 209 0.05 0.09 0.37 0.11 0.11 0.18 74% 22% 275%
Proﬁt Margin 214  0.04 0.01 0.38 0.03 0.05 0.14 89% 68% 765%
Table 5: Summary on operational data for our full sample both at the time the buyout transaction took place (Buyout) and at the
time of the public offering (IPO) with the corresponding number of observations as well as average growth rates between the two
dates. Data includes ﬁgures from the income statement and the balance sheet as well as common proﬁtability / efﬁciency ratios
(for a detailed description see appendix). All ﬁgures are in million USD except number of employees (in thousands) and ratios.
Table 5 shows vast improvements in operational performance of PE backed compa-
nies. However, all ﬁgures and growth rates are absolute values. At this point in time
no conclusion can be drawn concerning whether restructuring leads to operational
outperformance relative to comparable companies. Even more interesting in the wake
of our research focus is the fact that there are huge variations among growth rates.4
This suggests heterogeneity among restructuring impacts on operational performance,
which is part of our primary motivation.
The ﬁrst block in table 5 contains ﬁgures from top to the bottom line of the income
statement. On the top line we see that median sales growth is 61% during the private
3To derive reliable growth rates we had to limit statistics to ﬁrms for which we have data ranging
from LBO to IPO.
4This becomes obvious by comparing mean and median ﬁgures or by looking at the standard devia-
tion.
8period. Direct production costs and selling, general and administrative costs increase
to a lesser extent. As a consequence, EBITDA, EBIT and net income increase dispropor-
tionate to sales from LBO to IPO. The steepest increase comes at the bottom line with
the median net income level growing over 130%. Common balance sheet ﬁgures in the
second block reveal that assets grow to a lesser extent than sales, indicating an increase
in asset efﬁciency. It is interesting that while the median level of total assets on average
increases 35%, workforce hardly growths more than 10% which suggests workforce
efﬁciency gains. Shareholders equity is rising due to decreasing debt levels and a con-
sequential lower increase in total liabilities compared to total assets. Regarding capital
structure, ﬁnancial leverage decreases strongly during the course of the private time.
Looking at proﬁtability, respectively the efﬁciency ratios, while gross margins stay
roughly ﬂat, we ﬁnd a steep increase in operating and proﬁt margins. This suggests
enhanced organizational structure leading to lower administrative costs. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd strong growth rates for sales per employee and EBIT per employee ranging
between 25 and 40%.
2.5 Regional Differences
In order to account for diverse organizational structures and regional differences, sum-
mary statistics give an overview on the three sub samples: companies which are lo-
cated in the United States (US), companies which emerge from a division of a parent
company (Spinoff) and companies which are public at the time of the buyout (RLBO).
For ﬁguring out differences in operational characteristics at the time of the buyout and
at the time of the IPO, we give a statistical overview on mean values and provide t-
statistics for comparing two means.
Activity and size of the LBO market varies considerably in the relevant regions of
our sample. The US buyout market took the leading role, with the UK and Continental
Europe following suit. The ﬁrst buyout wave, which obviously had its starting point
in the early 80’s in the US, eventually made it to Europe a few years later. The second
wave in the late 90’s took place simultaneously. However, in terms of size Kaplan and
Strömberg (2009) report that the North American LBO market accounted for roughly
90% in the late ’80s with the UK and Continental Europe following with 7 and respec-
tively 3%. The heavy weight of the US transactions decreased to less than 50% share
of the global market for the period 2000 to 2007. The UK’s and continental Europe’s
share did rise to 15 respectively 30% in this time frame. Obviously the Asia/Paciﬁc
region and the rest of the world only play a minor role in the period we analyze. We
will therefore focus on the US and Western Europe.
Renneboog and Simons (2005) ﬁnd several possible explanations for the huge dif-
ference in size between the US, the UK and continental European buyout markets, es-
9pecially when looking at the ﬁrst buyout wave. These include differences in the ﬁnan-
cial infrastructure, entrepreneurial culture, exit options and legal and ﬁscal regulation.
In terms of factors that could be responsible for systematic performance variation be-
tween Europe and the US, Toms and Wright (2005) argue that different sources for debt
ﬁnancing and higher debt levels in the US could play a role. Furthermore, Renneboog
et al. (2007) name different tax treatments and a different buyout focus as sources that
could impact private equity backed companies. Buyout investors in the UK focus pri-
marily on companies in their growth phase rather than on mature and high cash ﬂow
generating companies PE investors focus on in the US. Even if a couple of these factors
have seen some kind of convergence in recent years, we still expect them to inﬂuence
the operational performance of our sample ﬁrms.
Buyout IPO
US non US US non US
mean stdv. mean stdv. t-value mean stdv. mean stdv. t-value
Sales 836.42 2197.65 756.97 1251.15 0.24 1087.21 2081.08 1054.81 2118.49 0.12
COGS 573.45 1553.85 657.04 1139.67  0.28 689.01 1319.73 907.65 1938.81  1.03
SGA 133.89 414.21 278.15 391.31  1.99 203.05 705.47 340.35 554.43  1.63
EBITDA 122.11 295.53 122.88 212.93  0.01 155.89 324.94 146.16 252.63 0.25
EBIT 44.22 130.08 66.83 116.50  1.06 102.28 167.88 95.51 165.85 0.32
Interest Expense 43.71 177.94 24.44 43.52 0.71 51.05 157.83 37.12 90.35 0.77
Tax 9.34 32.35 13.72 25.05  0.83 19.73 34.65 17.33 29.11 0.58
Net Income  9.83 92.92 21.52 86.28  2.09 29.41 76.41 42.82 87.32  1.35
Cash 53.25 151.07 56.13 102.91  0.11 54.85 112.31 52.35 87.28 0.19
Current Assets 266.63 536.58 383.54 700.88  1.03 315.86 684.78 392.21 785.95  0.83
Total Assets 1168.22 3450.43 1018.36 1897.98 0.28 1230.45 2954.91 1124.49 2231.99 0.31
Current Liab. 211.88 503.38 319.15 522.42  1.09 229.41 646.68 311.68 557.56  1.04
Total Liab. 1062.96 2926.96 785.88 1349.67 0.60 937.03 2347.54 775.12 1515.27 0.61
Shrd. Equity 137.98 747.78 255.05 761.30  0.92 286.64 715.25 355.33 783.38  0.75
Working Capital 54.21 153.94 112.21 216.91  1.67 88.07 138.85 81.54 321.42 0.24
# Employees 8.80 25.63 3.91 6.13 0.99 5.33 11.03 4.16 6.79 0.92
Liquidity Ratio 1.59 0.88 1.34 0.73 1.56 2.16 1.77 1.63 1.54 2.49
Leverage 0.61 0.34 0.40 0.30 2.84 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.21 1.58
Sales/Employees 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.25  0.22 0.43 1.01 0.52 1.74  0.54
EBIT/Employees 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.10  0.99 0.08 0.41 0.10 0.65  0.40
ROA  0.21 2.15 0.01 0.22  0.51 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.10  0.44
Asset Turnover 2.41 7.99 1.90 1.24 0.32 1.49 1.04 1.48 1.15 0.05
ROE 0.00 4.62 0.05 0.62  0.06  0.29 10.98 0.34 1.21  0.55
Gross Margin 0.34 0.23 0.41 0.24  1.60 0.37 0.20 0.38 0.23  0.33
Operating Margin 0.04 0.41 0.09 0.11  0.76 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.72
Proﬁt Margin  0.07 0.42 0.04 0.14  1.76 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.15  1.24
Table 6: Summary of operational data reporting mean and standard deviation values for US based against non US companies. The
ﬁrst major column represents ﬁgures at the time of the buyout; the second at the time of the IPO. Statistical signiﬁcance at both
points in time is evaluated by t-values. Data includes ﬁgures from the income statement and the balance sheet as well as common
proﬁtability / efﬁciency ratios (for a corresponding description see appendix). All ﬁgures are in million USD except number of
employees (in thousands) and ratios.
Comparing US buyouts with their non US counterparts in table 6, we ﬁnd a statis-
tically signiﬁcant difference in the leverage level. US companies have a substantially
higher debt to assets ratio at the time of the buyout. This causes lower net income
levels as interest payments are deducted to calculate net income. Obviously this leads
10to lower proﬁt margins at the time of the LBO. As mentioned above, differences in
transaction and company characteristics are an indication that the US LBO market is
structurally different compared to the European market. Whether a transaction is a
real leveraged buyout, containing substantial amounts of debt after the buyout, may
have a direct impact on operational performance in the private period.
In terms of size, which is measured by sales and total assets, US companies are on
average only slightly larger at the LBO. At the IPO, US companies are comparable to
their non US counterparts in size and proﬁtability ratios. Although leverage for US
ﬁrms declines, it is still at a higher level at the IPO even if it is no longer signiﬁcant.
Differences in net income and proﬁt margin are also no longer signiﬁcant.
2.6 Organizational Differences
Spinoffs
In contrast to mergers, a spinoff is a type of corporate restructuring transaction for
which the optimal size of the ﬁrm is expected to be smaller than present. As a con-
sequence, one of the driving forces to divest a division is certainly the conglomerate
discount. This is due to the fact that investors generally value a diversiﬁed ﬁrm be-
low the sum of the parts value (see for instance Burch and Nanda (2003) or Berger
and Ofek (1995)). Economic literature provides various theories and arguments for
splitting up large corporations. Diseconomies of decision-making could be a reason to
separate two business units due to too many assets or unequal assets under a single
management, or diseconomies of decision control by shareholders due to high costs of
evaluating and rewarding managerial performance (Schipper and Smith (1983)). Gert-
ner et al. (2002) also mention possible agency problems between top management and
divisional management of a company as one motivation to separate a division from its
parent. According to Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) post buyout ﬁrms that emerge from
a division rather than from an entire ﬁrm are often less hierarchical and more focused
than the companies from which they emerge.
11Buyout IPO
Spinoff Non-Spinoff Spinoff Non-Spinoff
mean stdv. mean stdv. t-value mean stdv. mean stdv. t-value
Sales 1273.01 2250.70 704.37 1951.07 1.67 1505.22 2591.42 962.88 1923.93 1.84
COGS 946.92 1836.71 497.07 1388.78 1.67 1071.58 2043.69 654.87 1301.38 1.87
SGA 247.68 357.92 143.83 424.43 1.40 319.05 498.14 229.29 700.17 0.94
EBITDA 284.65 555.72 86.35 147.79 3.46 242.06 495.32 128.80 222.90 2.61
EBIT 103.44 186.76 34.86 102.34 3.25 147.51 225.68 87.66 145.82 2.54
Interest Expense 50.67 101.18 37.24 171.35 0.48 65.70 135.34 42.01 141.88 1.15
Tax 19.78 36.05 7.99 29.12 2.21 29.26 36.93 16.52 31.52 2.51
Net Income 12.95 97.14  6.87 90.81 1.25 36.44 85.57 32.94 78.76 0.31
Cash 125.46 225.57 36.12 106.07 3.39 80.41 140.06 46.98 92.14 2.25
Current Assets 607.38 963.41 216.58 402.38 3.24 544.62 944.65 285.20 635.28 2.50
Total Assets 1804.91 3454.32 966.55 3089.75 1.53 1784.12 3202.01 1040.41 2594.77 1.92
Current Liab. 505.41 849.18 171.39 343.42 3.19 414.88 732.39 213.18 578.48 2.25
Total Liab. 1592.38 3103.36 853.52 2530.59 1.57 1342.79 2596.79 765.94 1965.40 1.91
Shrd. Equity 269.35 508.17 136.50 798.34 1.01 431.97 799.78 275.28 717.14 1.50
Working Capital 132.05 259.43 49.41 135.15 2.40 131.92 368.45 73.06 144.18 1.90
# Employees 11.17 15.95 5.94 22.12 0.91 6.15 10.44 4.64 9.76 1.05
Liquidity Ratio 1.56 0.85 1.51 0.85 0.23 2.09 1.88 1.96 1.67 0.53
Leverage 0.52 0.34 0.57 0.34  0.62 0.32 0.26 0.35 0.27  0.88
Sales/Employees 0.24 0.15 0.26 0.24  0.32 0.35 0.30 0.48 1.43  0.73
EBIT/Employees 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.56  0.71
ROA 0.00 0.13  0.21 2.18 0.52 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.11  0.59
Asset Turnover 1.34 0.88 2.55 8.08  0.79 1.32 0.91 1.53 1.11  1.37
ROE 0.16 1.06  0.03 4.64 0.21  2.03 17.43 0.44 4.77  1.92
Gross Margin 0.38 0.20 0.34 0.24 0.83 0.40 0.20 0.37 0.21 0.87
Operating Margin 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.41 0.81 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.11
Proﬁt Margin 0.01 0.10  0.05 0.42 0.98 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.16  0.44
Table 7: Summary of operational data reporting mean and standard deviation values for spinoff versus non-spinoff transactions.
The ﬁrst major column represents ﬁgures at the time of the buyout; the second at the time of the IPO. Statistical signiﬁcance at both
points in time is evaluated by t-values. Data includes ﬁgures from the income statement and the balance sheet as well as common
proﬁtability / efﬁciency ratios (for a corresponding description see appendix). All ﬁgures are in million USD except number of
employees (in thousands) and ratios.
Table 7 shows that at the time of the buyout spinoffs are signiﬁcantly larger than
pre buyout stand alone companies measured by sales. EBITDA and EBIT levels are
also signiﬁcantly higher which can at least in part be attributed to the size difference.
Proﬁtability ratios, which control for size, are higher but not statistically signiﬁcant. In
the year of the IPO, the spinoff subgroup is still signiﬁcantly larger measured by sales
and total assets. However, efﬁciency ratios lose their advance while proﬁt margins
even turn into laggards.
RLBOs
Reverse leveraged buyouts differ from the remaining buyouts in our sample in such
that companies are publicly listed at the time of the buyout. This fact severely impacts
the governance structure of the companies (ownership and control) and may therefore
lead to performance differences during the private period. Cumming et al. (2007) con-
sider the pre-buyout agency cost problems in private ﬁrms. Beneﬁts of private ﬁrms,
which usually have a small and concentrated shareholder group, are weighted against
possible agency problems connected with this ownership structure. According to the
12authors differences between public to private and private to private transactions could
impact post buyout productivity.
Buyout IPO
RLBO non RLBO RLBO non RLBO
mean stdv. mean stdv. t-value mean stdv. mean stdv. t-value
Sales 1557.02 3628.91 632.97 1302.68 2.75 1943.22 3382.71 890.54 1638.25 3.39
COGS 1022.62 2528.42 474.68 1066.93 2.06 1096.95 1940.92 658.42 1358.48 1.90
SGA 288.67 810.18 140.08 262.95 1.87 464.15 1378.95 206.95 378.76 2.41
EBITDA 116.68 175.99 123.94 303.74  0.13 250.03 365.78 131.45 285.47 2.57
EBIT 58.16 147.49 47.03 122.40 0.50 176.29 245.11 83.69 139.9 3.74
Interest Expense 95.52 332.53 25.48 56.72 2.60 112.35 280.52 32.09 74.75 3.85
Tax 21.10 49.75 7.68 23.74 2.50 33.77 49.83 15.91 27.31 3.59
Net Income  8.81 109.67  1.36 87.52  0.48 59.37 119.47 28.13 67.81 2.60
Cash 79.09 198.56 47.68 124.23 1.16 95.61 157.64 45.45 88.22 3.13
Current Assets 407.15 684.26 270.45 557.88 1.09 613.31 1199.90 278.64 538.74 3.07
Total Assets 2142.06 5702.44 873.68 2017.28 2.36 2363.86 4958.89 945.76 1894.03 3.47
Current Liab. 341.27 599.43 215.17 481.87 1.17 487.58 1108.09 203.67 423.15 3.03
Total Liab. 1838.45 4632.91 777.73 1761.86 2.32 1845.36 3767.02 678.05 1482.97 3.71
Shrd. Equity 334.26 1256.81 117.83 541.41 1.69 514.22 1318.08 263.87 529.33 2.26
Working Capital 77.68 221.70 62.10 151.43 0.47 127.53 222.45 76.11 212.28 1.57
# Employees 16.73 42.43 4.61 9.34 2.11 10.23 18.07 3.83 6.55 4.27
Liquidity Ratio 1.54 0.80 1.52 0.87 0.16 1.60 0.74 2.08 1.85  1.82
Leverage 0.63 0.33 0.54 0.34 1.25 0.46 0.26 0.32 0.27 3.44
Sales/Employees 0.21 0.20 0.27 0.23  0.87 0.22 0.20 0.51 1.40  1.46
EBIT/Employees 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07  0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.55  0.66
ROA  0.01 0.08  0.23 2.28 0.61 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.12  0.23
Asset Turnover 1.41 0.86 2.64 8.45  0.90 1.35 0.84 1.52 1.11  1.04
ROE 0.43 2.72  0.15 4.64 0.73 0.14 1.23  0.14 10.00 0.19
Gross Margin 0.33 0.20 0.36 0.24  0.50 0.37 0.22 0.38 0.21  0.12
Operating Margin 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.40 0.84 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.17 1.30
Proﬁt Margin  0.01 0.08  0.05 0.43 0.70 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.94
Table 8: Summary of operational data reporting mean and standard deviation values for RLBO vs. non RLBO transactions. The
ﬁrst major column represents ﬁgures at the time of the buyout; the second at the time of the IPO. Statistical signiﬁcance at both
points in time is evaluated by t-values. Data includes ﬁgures from the income statement and the balance sheet as well as common
proﬁtability / efﬁciency ratios (for a corresponding description see appendix). All ﬁgures are in million USD except number of
employees (in thousands) and ratios.
Figures in table 8 show that RLBOs are on average largest among the three sub-
groups, measured either by sales or total assets at the buyout and the IPO. These ﬁnd-
ings are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. EBITDA, EBIT and net income numbers
suggest that RLBO outperform their non RLBO counterparts, showing no signiﬁcance
attheLBObutsigniﬁcanceatthe1%levelattheIPO.Furthermore, wecanseeaslightly
higher leverage ratio at the LBO and a much slower decline in leverage during the pri-
vate time. This leads to a signiﬁcantly higher leverage ratio for RLBOs at the IPO.
Basis Regression
In our baseline regression all control variables are included without any explanatory
variables. Control variables include a dummy for each of our three subgroups (US,
spinoff and RLBO), the portfolio company’s age in years, the size measured by assets,
and the investment duration measured in years between entry and exit. We control for
industry and calendar years effects using dummy variables. Note that coefﬁcients and
13standard errors for industry and calendar year dummies are not explicitly reported in
the regression tables.
Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO -0.022 0.200 -0.063 0.380
(0.126) (0.188) (0.592) (0.552)
Spinoff 0.063 0.086 -0.979 -0.347
(0.146) (0.248) (0.680) (0.716)
US 0.148 0.116 1.149 1.210
(0.147) (0.189) (0.590) (0.510)
Company Age -0.001 -0.001 0.009 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inv. Duration 0.031 -0.017 0.197 0.329
(0.037) (0.054) (0.167) (0.167)
Obs. 188 145 206 146
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 9: Regression results for all base control variables including regional (US) and organizational dummies (RLBO / Spinoff).
Controlled for industry and calendar year. Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
Table 9 shows that US based companies have superior growth rates in net income
margin and cash ﬂow efﬁciency. In addition, longer investments tend to generate
higher growth in cash ﬂow efﬁciency. Age of the portfolio company, size measured
by total assets and the type of transaction (i.e., RLBO and spinoff) do not have a statis-
tically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on any of our efﬁciency growth rates.
3 Predictions and hypotheses
We derive hypotheses that match the most common private equity investors restruc-
turing activities. This set is comprehensive as it covers all critical arguments that deter-
mine the strategy and future development of a company: corporate strategy, corporate
governance, corporate ﬁnance, incentive structure and managerial ability. We back the
hypotheses with theoretic arguments. By testing the hypotheses we ﬁgure out which
activities systematically impact the operational performance of PE portfolio companies
in our sample.
Withouttaxes, bankruptcyandagencycosts, andasymmetricinformation, Modigliani
andMiller(1958)showthatachangeincapitalstructureshouldhavenoimpactonﬁrm
value or performance. However, with the separation of ownership and control agency
costs arise and capital structure matters. Various models ﬁnd that by choosing a cer-
tain debt level and thereby a corresponding free cash ﬂow level, the agency problem
between the manager and the owner of a ﬁrm can at least be mitigated. Studies consid-
ering this research area are Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Jensen (1989b),
14and Harris and Raviv (1990). Debt, which decreases free cash ﬂow because of interest
payments, can act as a disciplining device to the manager. In order to avoid default,
management refrains from wasting ﬁnancial resources and ceteris paribus operational
performance and shareholder value increase. Opler and Titman (1993) support this
hypothesis and conclude in their empirical analysis of buyout transactions, that debt
ﬁnancing is an important factor for realizing gains in going private transactions. How-
ever, Cotter and Peck (2001) suggest that given their empirical ﬁndings active monitor-
ing by buyout specialists is a substitute for a tighter debt structure.
Hypothesis 1. Debt / Free Cash Flow: A higher debt and respectively lower free cash ﬂow
level prevents the management from wasting resources and leads to an increase in performance
Mulherin and Boone (2000) classify theoretical literature on corporate restructur-
ing using acquisitions and divestitures into two categories: on the one hand there is
the non-synergistic theory based on managerial entrenchment, empire building and
managerial hubris, claiming that acquisitions should lead to lower performance be-
cause of less corporate focus. Divestitures in contrast can increase specialization and
lower agency costs and therefore lead to superior performance (For example see Jensen
(1986), Roll (1986) or Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). On the other hand, synergistic mod-
els based on Coase (1937) predict that both types of transactions should create value.
Changes in economic conditions like technology, transaction costs or input prices can
lead to a change in the optimal possessor of an asset. Early models on this topic include
Klein et al. (1978), Bradley et al. (1988) and Jensen (1993).
Hypothesis 2. Operational Restructuring: More frequent asset restructuring activity sys-
tematically impacts operational performance
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were among the ﬁrst to introduce agency costs for a
ownership structure where management does not own all outstanding equity. Ang
et al. (2000) empirically conﬁrm the prediction by Jensen and Meckling that agency
costs increase with a decrease of the management’s stake in the ﬁrm. If the manage-
ment is not able to increase its stake, another possibility to reduce or minimize agency
costs is that shareholders and directors monitor management. Because active monitor-
ing comes with a cost to the shareholders, it is only implemented if there is ownership
concentration. Consequentially, shareholders can only extract beneﬁts out of moni-
toring activities if their stake in the ﬁrm is large enough. Although ownership con-
centration reduces liquidity, a vast amount of literature predicts that it causes beneﬁts
due to more efﬁcient management control (Maug (1998), Bolton et al. (1998) or Pagano
and Röell (1998)). In the context of monitoring by the board of directors, literature
starting with Baysinger and Butler (1985) analyzes whether and how the composition
of the board of directors inﬂuences monitoring and hence operational performance.
15They ﬁnd a slight outperformance of companies with independent boards. However,
empirical examinations by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991) come to the conclusion that board composition does not matter.
Hypothesis 3. Ownership, Monitoring and Control: Higher ownership concentration
leads to more monitoring effort and tighter control which increases operating performance
Managerial ability may inﬂuence corporate performance. Especially in the private
equity industry, which is a specialized working environment, managerial experience
can be crucial. Govindarajan (1989) shows that functional experience in R&D is pos-
itively related to the successful implementation of differentiation strategies, whereas
functional experience in manufacturing is positively associated with the successful
implementation of low-cost strategies. McGee et al. (1995) ﬁnd that cooperative ar-
rangements and thereby greater success of the company are most beneﬁcial to ventures
where the management team has a high level of experience.
Hypothesis 4. Managerial (Investor) Experience: A higher level of managerial experience
leads to superior operating performance
A goal PE investors usually bear in mind is to increase managerial performance.
This can be either done by higher effort in monitoring the management (see hypothe-
sis 1 and 3) or simply by replacing the incumbent management team with a superior
successor. Several authors approached this issue. Huson et al. (2004) analyze whether
CEO turnover affects ﬁnancial performance. They ﬁnd that accounting performance
measures deteriorate relative to other ﬁrms prior to CEO turnover and improve there-
after. Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) ﬁnd signiﬁcant variation in the ex-ante stock return
of ﬁrms that dismissed their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. Similar to Huson et al., they
document a decrease in operational performance before and an increase after CEO dis-
missals.
Hypothesis 5. Managerial Replacement: Managerial replacement should lead to an in-
crease in operational performance
Economic literature generally agrees on the fact that the way management is com-
pensated inﬂuences the performance of the underlying company. Yermack (1997) ﬁnds
that stock prices increase after (non-publicly announced) grants of executive stock op-
tions. In addition Abowd (1990) offers evidence that granting stock-based incentives
to management improves subsequent stock price performance. In a random sample
of US manufacturing ﬁrms Mehran (1995) detects positive abnormal operational per-
formance for ﬁrms with stronger equity based management compensation and larger
management equity stakes. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
16that stock-based incentives are important drivers of managerial actions and opera-
tional performance.5
Hypothesis 6. Incentives: A higher level of equity based compensation should lead to better
operational performance
4 Results
We analyze which of the characteristics presented in section 2.3 drive performance
variation in our sample and estimate the growth determinants of our efﬁciency ratios.
The period of interest is the one from entry of the PE investor (LBO) to the beginning
of the exit (IPO). Our basis variables are included in every regression. Explanatory
variables belonging to the particular hypothesis are reported separately at the bottom
of the table.
Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO 0.110 0.123 0.401 -0.115
(0.107) (0.209) (0.684) (0.608)
Spinoff -0.078 0.113 -1.353 -0.090
(0.123) (0.279) (0.794) (0.794)
US -0.023 0.225 1.596 1.168
(0.126) (0.205) (0.660) (0.555)
Company Age -0.001 -0.001 0.015 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inv. Duration -0.017 -0.014 0.057 0.316
(0.031) (0.063) (0.205) (0.203)
Leverage -0.470 -0.396 1.109 1.294
(0.131) (0.251) (0.845) (0.741)
OBS. 143 128 158 127
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 10: Regression results for all four efﬁciency rations with leverage being the explanatory variable (Hypothesis 1). Controlled
for industry and calendar year. Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
Considering the prediction that a higher debt to assets ratio should act as a disci-
plining device to the manager and therefore to outperformance, we estimate the im-
pact of ﬁnancial leverage on all four efﬁciency ratios. Results can be found in table
10: Higher leverage levels cause signiﬁcantly higher cash ﬂow efﬁciency growth. We
check whether this effect disappears if we include our monitoring set of variables in
the regression as supposed by Cotter and Peck (2001). As a matter of fact the effect
from leverage even intensiﬁes if we control for monitoring. However, at the same
5For a summary of theoretical and empirical ﬁndings regarding executive compensation see Ashen-
felter and Card (1999)
17time we document signiﬁcantly lower growth in the level of gross proﬁt margin for
higher leverage ratios. Again, this result does not change if we include our monitoring
variables in the regression. As a consequence we can so far give no clear cut answer
to Hypothesis 1, as we ﬁnd conﬂicting arguments in terms of leverage and efﬁciency
changes.
Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RBLO -0.022 -0.039 0.205 0.136 -0.042 -0.457 0.517 0.147
(0.127) (0.129) (0.188) (0.197) (0.596) (0.582) (0.539) (0.575)
Spinoff 0.062 0.083 0.078 0.168 -0.996 -0.591 -0.387 -0.033
(0.147) (0.149) (0.248) (0.260) (0.683) (0.666) (0.697) (0.748)
US 0.148 0.148 0.111 0.121 1.144 1.181 1.178 1.282
(0.148) (0.147) (0.189) (0.189) (0.592) (0.570) (0.496) (0.510)
Company Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.009 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inv. Duration 0.031 0.030 -0.024 -0.019 0.189 0.173 0.267 0.347
(0.037) (0.037) (0.054) (0.054) (0.169) (0.162) (0.164) (0.167)
Acquisitions 0.003 0.088 0.113 0.746
(0.056) (0.099) (0.259) (0.273)
Divestitures 0.125 0.281 3.128 1.503
(0.191) (0.266) (0.866) (1.083)
Obs. 188 188 145 145 206 206 146 146
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 11: Regression results for all four efﬁciency rations with the number of acquisitions respectively divestitures as explanatory
variables (Hypothesis 2). Controlled for industry and calendar year. Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
Looking at Hypothesis 2, we ﬁnd that asset restructuring (i.e., acquisitions and di-
vestitures) does have an effect on operating efﬁciency. First, companies that make
acquisitions during the time they stay in the portfolio of the PE investor are able to
signiﬁcantly outperform with respect to cash ﬂow efﬁciency. Second, companies that
pursue divestitures subsequent to the LBO on average see higher net income margin
growth rates. Both results are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In the context of PE restruc-
turing, we can conﬁrm results of Mulherin and Boone (2000) analyzing acquisitions
and divestitures during the 90s. We ﬁnd evidence that supports the synergistic mod-
els of asset restructuring. Regression results for Hypothesis 2 can be found in table
11. To further strengthen our results, we run regressions for all four efﬁciency rations
with both acquisitions and divestitures as explanatory variables. Although both as-
set restructuring types are signiﬁcantly correlated we can reinforce our ﬁndings from
above. Detailed regression results for both explanatory variables case can be found in
the appendix in table 17.
18Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO 0.009 -0.015 0.012 0.221 0.200 0.191 -0.469 -0.056 -0.118 0.330 0.404 0.294
(0.133) (0.127) (0.134) (0.205) (0.189) (0.207) (0.685) (0.595) (0.624) (0.705) (0.545) (0.585)
Spinoff 0.012 0.044 -0.047 0.415 0.084 0.173 -0.766 -0.996 -1.059 0.563 -0.242 -0.608
(0.156) (0.147) (0.155) (0.291) (0.252) (0.283) (0.802) (0.689) (0.720) (1.014) (0.708) (0.800)
US 0.344 0.179 0.229 0.504 0.119 0.156 2.569 1.175 1.190 2.312 0.882 0.516
(0.263) (0.151) (0.174) (0.397) (0.196) (0.245) (1.219) (0.609) (0.735) (1.217) (0.528) (0.694)
Company Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.019 0.009 0.011 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inv. Duration 0.001 0.035 0.016 -0.037 -0.017 -0.008 0.028 0.199 0.097 0.455 0.295 0.416
(0.041) (0.037) (0.041) (0.066) (0.054) (0.067) (0.211) (0.168) (0.194) (0.240) (0.166) (0.196)
Director Ratio -0.561 -0.902 0.259 -1.156
(0.261) (0.417) (0,261) (1.449)
PE Chairman -0.108 -0.012 -0.109 1.146
(0.124) (0.186) (0.611) (0.553)
PE Stake -0.333 -0.188 0.689 3.239
(0.310) (0.534) (1.441) (1.529)
Obs. 160 188 175 114 145 131 161 206 189 108 146 134
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 12: Regression results for all four efﬁciency rations with the share of PE backed board representatives, the PE investors’ stake
and a PE backed chairman dummy as explanatory variables (Hypothesis 3). Controlled for industry and calendar year. Standard
errors are depicted in parentheses.
Hypothesis 3 covers ownership concentration, board composition and correspond-
ingmonitoringlevelsoftheportfoliocompany. Table12showsthatahigherownership
stake of the investor and monitoring through a PE connected chairman leads to higher
cash ﬂow efﬁciency growth rates. In contrast, a higher representation by the PE among
the board of directors leads to lower growth rates in both gross proﬁt and EBITDA
margins. The reason could be that PE board representatives cannot be counted as fully
independent members. This result may therefore be evidence for the conclusion by
Baysinger and Butler (1985) that independent boards are superior. Regressions consid-
ering all explanatory variables of hypothesis 3 do not alter these results dramatically.
While a higher director ratio still coincides with lower EBITDA and gross margins, sig-
niﬁcance levels drop to the 10% level. This could be due to relatively high correlation
with the other two explanatory variables of hypothesis 3. Impact of a PE connected
chairman is no longer signiﬁcant. Positive correlation between PE stake and PE chair-
man variables could be responsible for the change in signiﬁcance. Detailed results are
shown in table 18 (appendix).
19Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO -0.015 0.014 -0.047 0.199 0.110 0.105 -0.102 -0.585 -0.583 0.452 0.889 0.851
(0.127) (0.147) (0.147) (0.189) (0.213) (0.213) (0.597) (0.672) (0.688) (0.557) (0.708) (0.717)
Spinoff 0.057 0.000 0.040 0.087 0.410 0.411 -0.925 -0.325 -0.211 -0.430 0.42 0.416
(0.146) (0.182) (0.180) (0.250) (0.293) (0.292) (0.687) (0.807) (0.817) (0.721) (1.027) (1.050)
US 0.114 0.389 0.402 0.118 0.349 0.375 1.246 2.551 2.458 1.097 2.199 2.350
(0.150) (0.198) (0.196) (0.196) (0.264) (0.268) (0.612) (0.836) (0.858) (0.542) (0.853) (0.873)
Company Age 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.014 0.016 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inv. Duration 0.037 0.012 0.029 -0.017 -0.045 -0.042 0.186 -0.090 -0.008 0.337 0.639 0.591
(0.037) (0.048) (0.047) (0.054) (0.070) (0.068) (0.186) (0.217) (0.217) (0.168) (0.250) (0.252)
Independent PE 0.115 -0.006 -0.296 0.453
(0.102) (0.153) (0.168) (0.455)
PE Age at LBO 0.007 0.001 0.029 -0.028
(0.003) (0.005) (0.015) (0.019)
Amount Invested 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 188 146 146 145 109 109 206 151 151 146 107 107
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 13: Regression results for all four efﬁciency rations with the age of the PE investor, the PE investors’ experience (measured
by total investment) and a dummy whether the PE is a standalone ﬁrm as explanatory variables (Hypothesis 4). Controlled for
industry and calendar year. Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
We check whether PE investor characteristics and experience drive performance
variation in Hypothesis 4. Investors experience measured by age of the PE ﬁrm and
aggregated amount the ﬁrm invested signiﬁcantly drives gross proﬁt margin growth.
Furthermore, the older the PE investor, the higher the net income margin growth. The
PE investors’ approach is to inﬂuence managerial decision-making and to interfere in
strategic management of the company, tasks usually covered by incumbent manage-
ment. Resultsthereforeprovideevidenceforourhypothesisthatincreasedmanagerial,
i.e. investors’ experience, has a positive impact on operational performance. Indepen-
dence of the investor from banks or other corporations plays no role. Stand-alone,
independent PE investors are on average not signiﬁcantly driving performance in the
single explanatory variable regression. See table 13 for detailed results. However, if
all three investor characteristics are put into a single regression, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly
higher net income growth for independent PE investors. Furthermore we can conﬁrm
the positive impact of experience on gross proﬁt and net income margins growth. For
details see table 19 in the appendix.
20Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO -0.013 0.150 -0.132 0.480
(0.128) (0.190) (0.599) (0.562)
Spinoff 0.054 0.122 -0.924 -0.422
(0.147) (0.247) (0.684) (0.721)
US 0.134 0.162 1.257 1.152
(0.148) (0.190) (0.606) (0.514)
Company Age -0.001 -0.001 0.009 -0,003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0,007)
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inv. Duration 0.024 0.017 0.241 0.264
(0.039) (0.058) (0.176) (0.181)
Management Change 0.060 -0.245 -0.406 0.441
(0.107) (0.158) (0.499) (0.456)
Obs. 188 145 206 146
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 14: Regression results for all for efﬁciency growth ratios with a dummy for the case of managerial replacement after the
buyout as the sole explanatory variable (Hypothesis 5). Controlled for industry and calendar year. Standard errors are depicted
in parentheses.
The prediction of hypothesis 5, that management replacement after the investor
takes over control of the company leads to superior performance, has to be rejected.
Our dummy variable for the dismissal of the incumbent management has no signif-
icant inﬂuence on any of the four efﬁciency ratios we analyze. Results are shown in
table 14.
Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO -0.014 0.093 0.021 0.276 0.377 0.203 0.020 -0.160 0.028 0.794 1.164 0.538
(0.154) (0.123) (0.136) (0.190) (0.209) (0.208) (0.613) (0.693) (0.641) (0.713) (0.562) (0.620)
Spinoff 0.082 0.145 -0.025 0.279 0.237 0.234 -1.322 -0.701 -1.093 -0.360 -0.644 -0.540
(0.174) (0.142) (0.156) (0.275) (0.303) (0.289) (0.709) (0.842) (0.732) (0.991) (0.790) (0.850)
US 0.336 0.468 0.106 0.307 -0.122 0.091 -1.792 -1.777 1.220 1.108 0.442 1.113
(0.282) (0.269) (0.175) (0.394) (0.481) (0.242) (1.074) (1.634) (0.687) (1.189) (1.092) (0.637)
Company Age -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.014 0.006 0.011 -0.017 -0.012 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inv. Duration 0.044 0.028 0.029 0.004 -0.011 0.012 0.136 0.041 0.110 0.420 0.285 0.417
(0.044) (0.036) (0.041) (0.060) (0.069) (0.067) (0.182) (0.215) (0.196) (0.221) (0.171) (0.210)
Bonus to Base Ratio 0.096 -0.008 0.050 -0.133
(0.076) (0.108) (0.305) (0.380)
Equity Incentives 0.226 2.325 1.640 -0.420
(0.357) (0.666) (2.069) (1.953)
Management Stake 0.696 1.480 1.761 0.877
(0.509) (0.914) (2.273) (2.682)
Obs. 139 140 171 103 100 127 138 140 185 103 97 130
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 15: Regression results for all efﬁciency growth ratios with the ratio of bonus to base payment, incentives gives via equity
compensation and the management’s equity stake as explanatory variables (Hypothesis 6). Controlled for industry and calendar
year. Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
21Hypothesis 6 covers the issue of whether incentive compensation of management
(cash bonuses and equity components) or the management’s equity stake is respon-
sible for performance variation. We ﬁnd that the ratio of bonus to base cash com-
pensation has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on efﬁciency changes after the buyout.6 In the
single explanatory variable regression the same holds for the management’s equity
stake. Considering equity incentives given to upper level employees, we ﬁnd strong
statistical arguments that the higher the share of the company’s equity dedicated to
incentive schemes, the higher the growth in EBITDA margins. Table 15 shows the
corresponding numbers. Robustness checks including all three explanatory variables
further strengthen the result of the equity incentives. Furthermore, by controlling for
compensation, we ﬁnd that a higher management stake is signiﬁcantly driving net
income margins. Detailed ﬁgures for the multiple explanatory variable regressions
considering hypothesis 6 can be found in table 20 (appendix).
Concerning our basis control variables in the individual regressions, we ﬁnd only
a few signiﬁcant results for organizational differences: slight outperformance of RLBO
transactions and underperformance of spinoffs, depending on the particular explana-
tory variables. However, considering regional impacts we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive efﬁ-
ciency growth for US transactions in multiple regressions for cash ﬂow, net income and
gross proﬁt ratios. This could be due to the fact that US investors prefer companies in a
more mature stage as reported by Renneboog et al. (2007). It may also be the case, that
US based transactions have superior incentive structures. We ﬁnd lower signiﬁcance or
even negative inﬂuence of the US regional dummy if we control for incentives and PE
type in the regressions considering net income margin and cash ﬂow efﬁciency growth
as dependent variables. The age of the company only plays a minor role and the size
measured by total assets does not play a role at all. Finally, investment duration does
have a positive impact on cash ﬂow efﬁciency gains in a number for cases.
5 Robustness Check
To further strengthen our results, we run the regressions for all efﬁciency ratios with
all variables that have shown statistical signiﬁcance in the single explanatory variable
regressions. Results are shown in table 16.
6The bonus is almost always tied to EBITDA.
22Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO 0.104 0.399 -0.739 -0.046
(0.130) (0.222) (0.669) (0.622)
Spinoff -0.118 0.269 -0.136 -0.156
(0.149) (0.323) (0.804) (0.833)
US 0.208 0.388 2.455 0.448
(0.228) (0.821) (0.829) (0.725)
Company Age -0.001 -0.001 0.013 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inv. Duration -0.029 -0.015 -0.053 0.342
(0.045) (0.072) (0.216) (0.222)
Leverage -0.492 1.221
(0.180) (0.794)
Director Ratio -0.258 -0.284
(0.269) (0.450)
PE Age -0.005 0.030
(0.004) (0.015)
Amount Invested 0.000
(0.000)
Relative Incentives 2.454
(0.742)
Divestitures 2.312
(1.230)
Acquisitions 0.664
(0.336)
PE Chairman 1.009
(0.601)
PE Stake 2.156
(1.695)
Obs. 103 97 151 117
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 16: Regression results for all response variables putting in all explanatory variables that show signiﬁcance in the preceding
section at one time. Controlled for industry and calendar year. Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
The positive effect of leverage on cash ﬂow efﬁciency is no longer signiﬁcant. The
negative effect on the level of gross proﬁt margin is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
indicating a negative effect of leverage on operating efﬁciency. We therefore reject
hypothesis 1, that a higher leverage ratio leads to positive operational performance.
This result stands in contrast to arguments mentioned in the theoretical motivation of
this hypothesis as well as to the results from the empirical analysis by Guo et al. (2011).
However, Guo et al. consider the change in leverage from pre buyout levels and not the
absolute level as this study does. Hypothesis 2, which tests whether asset restructur-
ing has a positive effect on operating efﬁciency, is conﬁrmed. We can show that more
acquisitions signiﬁcantly increase the cash ﬂow efﬁciency growth rate, whereas more
divestitures lead to a higher level in net income proﬁt margins. In terms of ownership
concentration and monitoring, we ﬁnd that the positive effect on cash ﬂow efﬁciency
of the PE chairman variable is still present. PE investor representation and the size of
the PE investor’s equity stake are no longer signiﬁcant. This could be due to the sub-
23stitutability between the disciplining effect of leverage and monitoring. Nevertheless,
these results provide evidence that a high level of monitoring is positively correlated
to operational performance (hypothesis 3). PE investor experience is still showing a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on performance variation as predicted by hypothesis 4. A higher
aggregated amount invested leads to a steeper increase in gross proﬁt margins. Fur-
thermore, the number of years the PE ﬁrm is in business has a signiﬁcant positive
effect on the increase in net income margins. Managerial replacement is not driving
operational performance and hypothesis 5 has to be rejected. Finally, regarding top
level employees and executive management incentive scheme, stronger equity based
compensation leads to superior EBITDA margin growth - as predicted in hypothesis 6.
Considering our basis control variables, we can conﬁrm outperformance of RLBO
transactions measured by EBITDA efﬁciency growth as well as a strong inﬂuence of US
based transactions on net income margin growth. Furthermore, the age of the portfolio
company still slightly impacts net income margin growth.
6 Conclusion
We document broad based growth in absolute operational performance during the pri-
vate period subsequent to leveraged buyouts. While there is both bottom and top line
growth, outperformance of the bottom line suggests efﬁciency gains originate from
enhanced organizational structure, respectively lower administrative costs. Further-
more, while the absolute workforce stays roughly ﬂat, workforce efﬁciency increases
considerably.
Comparing US with European transactions, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial leverage is sig-
niﬁcantly higher for US portfolio companies. This leads to lower proﬁt margins at
the time of the buyout. After the restructuring period, US and non US companies
are comparable in size and proﬁtability. Financial leverage is still higher while no
longer signiﬁcant. After all, US portfolio companies have signiﬁcantly higher net in-
come cash ﬂow margin growth rates compared to European companies. Regarding
organizational differences, spinoff and RLBO transactions are signiﬁcantly larger than
the remaining transactions measured by sales and total assets. However, transaction
types do not seem to have a major impact on operational performance.
Investigating how private equity investors increase operating efﬁciency, we ﬁnd
several common activities showing an impact: First, more frequent acquisitions and
divestitures lead to signiﬁcant outperformance. This result supports synergistic mod-
els of assets restructuring. Second, stronger monitoring due to larger investor equity
stakes and a PE-connected chairman show signiﬁcantly higher cash ﬂow efﬁciency
growth rates. However, higher investor representation among the board of the portfo-
24lio company has a negative impact on performance. Third, more experienced investors
measured by age and total amount invested, causes signiﬁcantly higher gross proﬁt
margin growth. Finally, our fourth ﬁnding reveals that strong equity incentives given
to management and top level employees leads to superior growth in EBITDA mar-
gins. Robustness checks by putting all explanatory variables showing signiﬁcance in
one regression do basically conﬁrm our results. Only the negative impact of investor
representation on the board of directors disappears.
Our results suggest that there is a set of activities that PE investors commonly em-
ploy to restructure their portfolio companies, which systematically drives operational
performance. These activities separate the top performing from the least performing
companies in our sample. While steep incentives, frequent asset restructuring, tight
monitoring and experienced investors lead to outperformance, higher levels of ﬁnan-
cial leverage and managerial replacement do not.
However, a caveat of our approach to examine operational performance determi-
nants of private equity portfolio companies is that all sample companies were sold
back to the public in an IPO. Due to poor data availability for private companies, we
have to limit our sample to LBOs which are eventually listed on a stock exchange. As
a consequence we do not have a perfect random sample of private equity owned cor-
porations and so sample selection is an obvious problem. General conclusions about
performance determinants in LBO transactions must therefore be drawn with caution.
Future research on operating performance determinants among LBO transactions
should try to incorporate performance evaluation on a relative basis by matching to
comparable companies. Although this approach has been considered before, to our
knowledge there are currently no studies considering determinants of relative perfor-
mance. Furthermore, tracking the performance of several portfolio companies belong-
ing to the same PE investor rather than individual companies could be interesting in
order to account for possible synergies or cross company effects. This can be partic-
ularly insightful if investors pursue a buy and build strategy to leverage operational
performance. Finally, avoiding the limited focus on companies with a subsequent IPO
could allow a more general conclusion on PE portfolio company performance drivers
as only half of all LBOs begin their exit process with an IPO.
25Appendix
Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO -0,041 0,152 -0,485 0,438
(0,131) (0,200) (0,588) (0,577)
Spinoff 0,085 0,147 -0,567 -0,289
(0,152) (0,263) (0,670) (0,741)
US 0,149 0,117 1,187 1,199
(0,148) (0,190) (0,572) (0,501)
Company Age -0,001 -0,001 0,009 -0,001
(0,002) (0,002) (0,006) (0,006)
Total Assets 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Inv. Duration 0,030 -0,024 0,179 0,276
(0,037) (0,054) (0,163) (0,167)
Acquisitions -0,006 0,061 -0,096 0,701
(0,058) (0,104) (0,256) (0,297)
Divestitures 0,130 0,230 3,204 0,455
(0,197) (0,281) (0,892) (1,151)
Obs. 188 145 206 146
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 17: Regression results with all existing explanatory variables for Hypothesis 2. Controlled for industry and calendar year.
Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO 0,048 0,211 -0,523 0,274
(0,140) (0,216) (0,702) (0,688)
Spinoff -0,039 0,451 -0,637 0,355
(0,162) (0,312) (0,834) (1,007)
US 0,418 0,504 2,344 1,171
(0,237) (0,416) (1,257) (1,233)
Company Age -0,001 -0,001 0,020 -0,008
(0,002) (0,003) (0,009) (0,009)
Total Assets 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Inv. Duration 0,001 -0,043 0,053 0,398
(0,042) (0,069) (0,215) (0,233)
Director Ratio -0,522 -0,879 -0,039 -2,412
(0,274) (0,444) (1,415) (1,463)
PE Chairman -0,068 0,063 0,009 1,088
(0,128) (0,198) (0,644) (0,660)
PE Stake -0,296 -0,187 1,771 4,929
(0,351) (0,602) (1,764) (2,120)
Obs. 158 113 160 107
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 18: Regression results with all existing explanatory variables for Hypothesis 3. Controlled for industry and calendar year.
Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
26Gross Proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO -0,003 0,110 -0,546 1,013
(0,145) (0,216) (0,688) (0,716)
Spinoff -0,015 0,404 -0,238 0,186
(0,178) (0,296) (0,819) (1,046)
US 0,405 0,376 2,450 2,291
(0,193) (0,271) (0,848) (0,864)
Company Age 0,000 -0,001 0,014 -0,003
(0,002) (0,003) (0,008) (0,009)
Total Assets 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Inv. Duration 0,021 -0,042 -0,103 0,643
(0,047) (0,071) (0,219) (0,250)
Independent PE 0,266 0,079 -0,382 0,807
(0,130) (0,191) (0,618) (0,659)
PE Age at LBO 0,006 0,001 0,032 -0,028
(0,003) (0,005) (0,016) (0,020)
Amount Invested 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Obs. 146 109 151 107
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 19: Regression results with all existing explanatory variables for Hypothesis 4. Controlled for industry and calendar year.
Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
Gross proﬁt EBITDA Net Income CFOA
RLBO 0,094 0,271 -0,476 1,260
(0,123) (0,235) (0,698) (0,657)
Spinoff -0,001 0,265 -1,690 -0,865
(0,146) (0,355) (0,865) (0,994)
US 0,331 -0,496 -1,757 0,821
(0,288) (0,679) (1,783) (1,541)
Company Age 0,000 0,000 0,013 -0,013
(0,002) (0,004) (0,010) (0,011)
Total Assets 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Inv. Duration -0,015 -0,048 -0,023 0,253
(0,036) (0,075) (0,221) (0,219)
Bonus to Base Ratio 0,002 0,009 -0,111 -0,071
(0,059) (0,126) (0,349) (0,349)
Equity Incentives 0,656 1,567 4,493 -1,086
(0,381) (0,887) (2,324) (2,272)
Management Stake 0,062 -0,800 7,607 -2,062
(0,565) (1,280) (3,386) (3,615)
Obs. 114 87 112 84
Signiﬁcance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Table 20: Regression results with all existing explanatory variables for Hypothesis 6. Controlled for industry and calendar year.
Standard errors are depicted in parentheses.
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